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Abstract
Over the past 70 years, the number of international environmental agree-
ments (IEAs) has increased substantially, highlighting their prominent role in
environmental governance. This paper applies the toolkit of network analysis
to identify the network properties of international environmental cooperation
based on 546 IEAs signed between 1948 and 2015. We identify four stylised
facts that offer topological corroboration for some key themes in the IEA lit-
erature. First, we find that a statistically significant cooperation network did
not emerge until the early 1970, but since then the network has grown contin-
uously in strength, resulting in higher connectivity and intensity of coopera-
tion between signatory countries. Second, over time the network has become
closer, denser and more cohesive, allowing more effective policy coordination
and knowledge diffusion. Third, the network, while global, has a noticeable
European imprint: initially the United Kingdom and more recently France and
Germany have been the most strategic players to broker environmental cooper-
ation. Fourth, international environmental coordination started with the man-
agement of fisheries and the sea, but is now most intense on waste and haz-
ardous substances. The network of air and atmosphere treaties is weaker on a
number of metrics and lacks the hierarchical structure found in other networks.
It is the only network whose topological properties are shaped significantly by
UN-sponsored treaties.
Keywords: environmental cooperation; international environmental agreements;
global governance; network analysis
2
1 Introduction
In a globalised and interconnected world, international cooperation is crucial to
the betterment of society. Pressing environmental issues are a particular case in
point. Many of the most urgent environmental dilemmas require collaboration
across countries (Rosenau, 2004; Andonova et al., 2009; O’neill, 2017). Sometimes
cooperation involves a relatively limited number of parties (e.g. to manage a shared
water body), sometimes it requires broad coalitions of many nations (e.g. for global
threats like climate change).
Understanding how environmental coalitions have emerged and expanded is
therefore an important question in international cooperation and global governance
research. The literature has tackled the problem both theoretically and empirically,
using among others the tools of game theory (e.g. Barrett, 2003; Barrett et al., 2007;
de Zeeuw, 2015; Harstad, 2016; Battaglini and Harstad, 2016; O’neill, 2017), inter-
national relations (e.g. Falkner, 2013b; Mitchell, 2002) and experimental economics
(e.g. Milinski et al., 2006, 2008; Tavoni et al., 2011; Barrett and Dannenberg, 2012).
The subject of interest in these studies is typically a particular international en-
vironmental agreement (IEA). Researchers are interested in the political, game the-
oretic or behavioural dynamics that explain the emergence, design or effectiveness
of a treaty (e.g. Breitmeier et al., 2011; Young, 1999). The success of the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, for example, has been ex-
plained by the rapid emergence of a low-cost substitute to chlorofluorocarbons,
which created an economic incentive to cooperate (Barrett, 1994; Wagner, 2016).
What tends to be overlooked by the focus on individual treaties is that, as a
collective, IEAs have given rise to a dense network of environmental cooperation.
Recent decades have witnessed a significant increase in the number of IEAs, reach-
ing a total of almost 2000 in 2015. The number of signatories has increased from 6
in 1869 (when there were fewer sovereign nations) to 238 in 2015, including not just
nation states, but also international organisations, dependent territories and sub-
national entities. As such, IEAs are a central building block in the global system
of multilateral, multi-level, polycentric environmental governance (Ostrom, 2009;
Jordan et al., 2018).
The breadth and depth of environmental cooperation through IEAs has been
documented in information sources such as ECOLEX (IUCN, 2017) and the In-
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ternational Environmental Agreements Data Base (Mitchell, 2003; Mitchell et al.,
2020). Their main interest is often the classification and categorisation of individ-
ual treaty types.
Here, we are interested in the network of cooperation these treaties create. While
every environmental agreement, or attempt to lead to one, has its own particular
motivation and objectives, our ability to successfully manage global environmen-
tal threats depends on the synergies and interactions between multiple treaties.
The strength of cooperative ties is affected not only by country attributes (Mitchell,
2002), but also by the structure of cooperation (Kinne, 2013).
The structure of a network per se provides important insights into its functioning
as a system of interacting components (Jackson, 2010). Many important mecha-
nisms that determine the likelihood of cooperation, such as reciprocity and reputa-
tion (Dai et al., 2010; Hafner-Burton et al., 2009), are related to third-party ties. As
such the network of cooperation not only reflects existing cooperative relationships,
but also influences the costs and benefits of future cooperative attempts (Kinne,
2013).
We apply the toolkit of network analysis to ECOLEX, one of the largest collec-
tions of data on IEAs, with a view to better understand the structure and dynamics
of global environmental cooperation. In doing so, we elucidate, with new quan-
titative evidence, some long-standing debates in the economics and political sci-
ence literature on international (environmental) agreements, global governance,
and international cooperation and offer topological corroboration for several con-
jectures supported by either qualitative or preliminary correlational evidence. We
shed light on how collective and cooperative environmental behaviour emerged
and evolved over time, and unveil the role that individual countries played in sus-
taining or hindering such collaborative behaviour.
Specifically, we analyse the topology of an inter-temporal environmental coop-
eration network, where each node is a country that has signed IEAs and each link
connects two countries that have co-signed one or more IEAs. Our data cover 546
environmental treaties agreed between 1948 and 2015. Crucially, the topological
position of a country in the network is not simply based on the number of treaties
it has signed, but is assessed by constructing a proper null model and filtering out
connections that might also be found in a network of random connections.
Our research approach is inductive. Rather than trying to test particular hy-
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potheses or governance theories, we let the data speak. We use global topological
metrics to identify a number of salient network features - or stylised facts - that
describe the evolution and current landscape of international environmental coop-
eration.
We identify four such stylised facts. First, network analysis dates the emergence
of meaningful environmental cooperation to the early 1970s. A statistically signifi-
cant environmental cooperation network materialised in 1971 and reached stability
in 1980. Before then, treaty links were too weak. Since then the network has grown
steadily in size and strength, resulting in higher connectivity between signatory
countries. As such, our data support earlier findings on the pivotal role played by
events like the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, as
posited in Falkner and Buzan (2019).
Second, network analysis shows how, through membership interconnections,
environmental cooperation has become closer, denser and more cohesive. The
paths through which countries can reach each other have shortened, creating more
effective platforms for policy coordination and knowledge diffusion. This is con-
sistent with the view of IEAs as vehicles for engagement, which provide organisa-
tional structures, reflect a shared purpose and engender trust (e.g., Meyer et al.,
1997; Bernauer et al., 2010; Ostrom, 2009; Owen and Videras, 2008).
Third, we find that the environmental cooperation network, while global, has
a noticeable European imprint. Initially the United Kingdom and more recently
France and Germany have been the most important network nodes, through which
IEAs are facilitated. Although there are fluctuations, the strategic position of coun-
tries has remained relatively stable over time. As such, network analysis corrobo-
rates the view of international relations scholars like Vogler and Stephan (2007)
and Kelemen and Vogel (2010) who discuss the leadership role of European coun-
tries in (domestic and international) environmental issues, explaining it as a reflec-
tion of domestic political dynamics (e.g. the role of the Green Party in Germany)
and a consequence of the intermittent interest of the United States in environmental
diplomacy.
Fourth, we find that international environmental coordination started with the
management of fisheries and the sea, but is now most intense on waste and haz-
ardous substances. The networks on species, waste and natural resources have a hi-
erarchical structure, which is absent in the networks on sea and fisheries and air and
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atmosphere. Despite its policy salience, the network of air and atmosphere treaties
is comparatively less cohesive and intense. It is also the only subject area where
UN-sponsored treaties (such as those on climate change and trans-boundary air
pollution in Europe) have had a significant impact on the topological properties
of the network. The results speak to the level of ’regime complexity’ described by
Meyer et al. (1997) and Keohane and Victor (2011), and might explain the ambiva-
lence towards the UN in much of the environmental governance literature (Bier-
mann and Bauer, 2004; Ivanova, 2010; Mee, 2005).
Our findings are relevant and contribute to a number major debates in the eco-
nomics and political science literature. At its broadest, our paper is therefore part
of the wider theoretical and conceptual literature in economics and political science
on (environmental) governance and international (environmental) cooperation.
From a methodological perspective the paper relates more narrowly to a strand
of empirical literature at the crossroad of economics and political science, which
leverages large data sets on IEAs, such as the one we use, to identify empirical pat-
terns of environmental cooperation. Four studies, which our paper complements,
are worth highlighting.
Kim (2013) examines a network of IEAs linked through citations and finds an
international environmental governance system that is characterised by a cohesive
polycentric legal structure. Hollway and Koskinen (2016) apply network analy-
sis to the governance of global fisheries, using and identifying a high degree of
social embeddedness in the system. Wagner (2016) uses a structural model of in-
ternational negotiations to estimate the date when countries ratified the Montreal
Protocol as well as the dynamics of trade agreements. Finally, Mitchell et al. (2020)
discuss the potential, without yet exploiting it, of the International Environmental
Agreements Data Base, a similar database to ECOLEX, to better understand the
formation of IEAs.
Our paper also relates to a connected literature, which applies network analysis
to wider international relations contexts, including trade, financial integration, and
technology diffusion (e.g. Smith and White, 1992; Kim and Shin, 2002; Fagiolo et al.,
2010; Schiavo et al., 2010; Vega and Mandel, 2018; Htwe et al., 2020; Hafner-Burton
et al., 2009).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the
data and the construction of the environmental cooperation network. Section 3
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motivates the subsequent analysis with a set of simple statistics about international
environmental cooperation. The main results are contained in sections 4 to 7, each
of which introduces a different stylised fact, or salient network feature. Section 8
concludes.
2 Data and methodology
2.1 Environmental treaty data
We use global data on IEAs from ECOLEX (IUCN, 2017), which combines infor-
mation on environmental laws and treaties from several sources. As in Mitchell
(2003), the treaties included in the ECOLEX database are defined as intergovern-
mental documents intended as legally binding with a primary stated purpose of preventing
or managing human impacts on natural resources1.
The database contains information on 1, 998 environmental treaties signed by
238 parties between 1868 to 2015. We exclude 1, 411 treaties on which important
dates (e.g., on treaty ratification and entry into force) are missing. In addition, we
focus on treaties signed by countries and not by other parties such as international
organisations, dependent territories and sub-state territories. Finally, we focus on
the post-war period. After this selection, our final sample comprises 546 environ-
mental treaties signed over the period 1948-2015 by 200 countries. The 546 treaties
are illustrative of the network as a whole and include the largest and most impor-
tant global treaties.
For each treaty we have information on signatory countries, subject areas (e.g.,
nature conservation, waste, climate, etc.), the date it was signed and the date it
entered into force. The data also include country information on the dates of treaty
ratification, acceptance or approval and the date of withdrawal, where applicable.
The data are then organised into a country-treaty-year panel, which lists for
each country the IEAs it was a member of at the end of each year and/or for each
treaty its signatories at the end of each year.
1The official definition Track changes is on 6 for international treaties originates from the Vienna
Convention on The Law of Treaties (1969). The definition used here has been adapted to treaties
on environmental matters.
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2.2 Network construction
We next convert the country-treaty-year data into a sequence of annual environ-
mental cooperation networks. The conversion process involves three steps. The
first step is the construction of annual bipartite networks, that is, two-mode net-
works where a link is established between a country and a treaty if the former has
signed the latter. In the second step, we use one-mode projections to convert the
bipartite networks into one-mode cooperation networks, in which a link is estab-
lished between any two countries if both have signed at least one common treaty.
The final step concerns statistical validation, that is, the identification of statis-
tically significant links through comparison with an appropriate null model.
2.2.1 The bipartite networks
Our raw data document which country is a member of which treaty in a specific
year. In network analysis, this type of data is called affiliation data. A broad range
of affiliation data has been studied, such as women’s attendance of events (Davis
et al., 1941), corporate board memberships (Robins and Alexander, 2004; Battiston
and Catanzaro, 2004), co-authorship data (Newman, 2001a,b), and actors-movies
relations (Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Newman, 2001a). Co-membership of groups
or events, such as countries’ membership in IEAs, indicates social ties or in our case
cooperative relationships among countries signing the same treaties (Borgatti and
Halgin, 2011).
In network analysis, affiliation data can be abstracted as a bipartite network.
Also known as two-mode networks or affiliation networks, bipartite networks have
two disjoint classes of nodes, participants and groups or events, and links connect-
ing participants to groups or events (Latapy et al., 2008). Accordingly, we can rep-
resent the country-treaty relationships as a bipartite network in which, if a country
signs a treaty, a link is created between the country and the treaty, as shown in the
left-hand panel of Fig. 1.
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Figure 1: Network construction
2.2.2 One-mode projections
The cooperative tie between two countries is defined as the co-affiliation with, or
co-participation in, the same treaties. In other words, if two countries are signato-
ries of the same treaty or treaties, there is a cooperative tie between them, as shown
in the right-hand panel of Fig. 1. To obtain these cooperative ties, we need to project
the bipartite network defined above onto a one-mode network using the country
layer. In network science, this process is called one-mode projection and the re-
sulting networks are called one-mode networks. We call the annual one-mode net-
works obtained through this process the environmental cooperation network, or
cooperation network for short.
Links are not just binary, i.e., either present or absent, but are characterised by
their intensity or strength. Heterogeneity in the intensity of links encodes valuable
network information (Barrat et al., 2004). We quantify the intensity of cooperation
by assigning a weight to each link, which is proportional to the number of treaties
two countries have co-signed and inversely proportional to the number of signatory
countries involved in each common treaty (Newman, 2001b). This implies that, all
else being equal, bilateral treaties contribute more to the intensity of cooperation
between two countries than multilateral treaties.
2.2.3 Bipartite null models and statistically validated projections
To ensure that the cooperation network truly reflects the relationship between coun-
tries, we filter out any connections that might also be found in a random network
where links are assigned by chance. That is, we remove any links that are not sta-
tistically significant. A variety of methods have been proposed to determine which
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links are significant (Serrano et al., 2009; Neal, 2014; Latapy et al., 2008; Saracco
et al., 2017). Here we adopt the grand canonical algorithm proposed by Saracco
et al. (2017), which can be used to obtain a statistically-validated projection of any
binary, undirected, bipartite network. The general idea underpinning this method
is that any two countries should be connected in the corresponding one-mode pro-
jection, i.e., the cooperation network, if, and only if, they co-signed a statistically
significant number of treaties.
The algorithm can be applied through the following four steps. First, for each
pair of countries, the number of co-signed treaties is computed. This can be re-
garded as a measure of the degree of similarity between the two countries.
The second step quantifies the statistical significance of the similarity between
each pair of countries. The null hypothesis here is that the observed similarity be-
tween any two countries can be explained simply by chance, given the involvement
of the two countries in various treaties. To test this hypothesis, an appropriate null
model is needed.2 Here, we adopt the bipartite partial configuration model. This
model is part of the entropy-based exponential random graph (ERG) class of null
models, and constrains only the degrees of the nodes in the layer of interest, i.e., in
our case the number of treaties each country has signed (Saracco et al., 2017, 2015;
Park and Newman, 2004; Squartini and Garlaschelli, 2011).
More specifically, the partial configuration model generates a bipartite network
in which each country has exactly the same degree (i.e., participation in the same
number of treaties) as in the original bipartite network, but the connections be-
tween countries and treaties have been randomly reshuffled. Given two countries
ci and cj , the distribution describing the behaviour of each value of similarity be-
tween ci and cj is the Poisson–Binomial distribution. That is, the Poisson-Binomial
distribution describes the probability that two given countries ci and cj co-sign
nTci,cj treaties simply by chance, with nTci,cj = [0, ..., NT ], and where NT is the total
number of treaties. Based on this bipartite partial configuration model, measur-
ing the statistical significance of the observed value n′Tcc,cj thus implies calculating
a p−valueci,cj on the Poisson–Binomial distribution, i.e., the probability that ci and
cj co-sign a number of treaties greater than, or equal to, the n′Tcc,cj simply by chance.
Notice that, as a one-tail statistical test, this approach would lead to establishing
a link between any two countries if the observed number of co-signed treaties is
2The Python code for this step can be obtained from https://github.com/tsakim/bipcm.
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“sufficiently large”.
Third, once the M p−values associated to each pair of countries have been cal-
culated (whereM = (NC
2
) is the total number of possible pairs of countries andNC
the total number of countries), we adopt a statistical procedure for simultaneously
testing multiple hypotheses of similarities between pairs of countries. This is nec-
essary to account for the lack of independence of similarities (and associated p−
values), since each observed link in the original bipartite network between a given
country and a given treaty inevitably affects the number of common treaties that
country co-signs with each of the remaining countries, and therefore the similari-
ties of several pairs of countries. To account for this, we applied the so-called False
Discovery Rate (FDR) procedure, which controls for the expected number of false
“discoveries” (i.e., incorrectly-rejected null hypotheses, Benjamini and Hochberg
1995). To this end, we sort the M p−values in increasing order and then identified
the largest integer î such that p−valueî ≤ îαM , where α is the single-test significance
level, which here we set at 0.01.
As a final fourth step, we obtain a statistically-validated projection of the bipar-
tite network by considering as statistically significantly similar only those pairs of
countries ci and cj whose p − valueci,cj ≤ p − valueî. Equivalently, this translates
into rejecting the null hypotheses of observing by chance the similarities between
countries when the corresponding p−values are smaller than the given FDR thresh-
old. In this way, a link will be established only between pairs of countries that are
sufficiently similar, i.e., that have co-signed a larger number of treaties than would
be randomly expected. All our subsequent analysis will be based on such a statis-
tically validated network projection.
2.3 Network analysis
We adopt global metrics from network science to quantify the topological struc-
ture of the environmental cooperation network as it evolved over time. Our cho-
sen metrics include measures of network size (cumulative frequency of nodes and
links), connectivity (average degree, average strength), and social cohesion (den-
sity, shortest path length, number of components, and clustering coefficient). In
addition, the roles of countries in the cooperation network are investigated through
centrality measures, such as betweenness centrality and closeness centrality.
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Cumulative frequency of nodes and links. The size of a network can be mea-
sured straightforwardly through the number of nodes and links it contains. In a
dynamic setting the growth in network size can be measured through cumulative
distributions of nodes and links over time.
Degree and strength. The degree k of a node is the number of links connected
to it. In weighted networks, the metric of node degree is complemented by node
strength, s, which is the sum of the weights of the links incident upon the node (Bar-
rat et al., 2004). In our cooperation network, the degree of a country indicates
the number of partners which this country cooperates with, while the strength
accounts for the intensity of cooperation between this country and others. The
average degree and average strength of a network are global variables of network
connectivity. In contrast, the degree and strength of individual nodes are local mea-
sures of connectivity. A node with a higher degree is expected to have more access
to information and to be more salient for communication activities in the network
than nodes with lower degrees (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009; Freeman, 1978).
Density. The density of a network is the ratio between the actual number of
links m and the maximum possible number of links, i.e., (n
2
)
= 1
2
n(n − 1), where
n is the number of nodes in the network. Density ranges from 0, when no link is
established, to 1, when all possible links have been established. In the cooperation
network, density measures the portion of the potential cooperative connections that
are actual connections through treaties. Thus, the network density can be seen as
an indicator of cooperative cohesion among countries.
Shortest path length. For a binary network, the shortest path length dij be-
tween node i and node j is the length of the path with the lowest number of links
separating the two nodes (Newman, 2018). In weighted networks, shortest path
lengths between nodes are traditionally measured through the algorithm proposed
by Dijkstra (1959). In this case, weights indicate the cost of information transmis-
sion or resource flow, and distances are calculated as sums of the weights of the
links traversed. Thus, the weighted shortest path length between any two nodes
is the path with the least resistance in terms of exchange costs. However, in our
study the weights of links do not represent the cost, but the intensity of coopera-
tion between countries, and therefore we use the reciprocal of weights to identify
weighted shorted paths using the Dijkstra’s algorithm (Newman, 2001b; Brandes,
2001). Hence, in our network, the higher the weight of the link, the closer two
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countries are and the lower the cost of cooperation.
Component. A component is a largest subset of nodes in a network in which
there exists at least one path between any pair of nodes. The components in a
network organise the network into different isolated subgraphs, and the number
of components in a network can therefore be used to assess isolation of nodes. All
else being equal, a network with more (and smaller) components is less cohesive,
as countries only build cooperative ties within the same component. Conversely,
a smaller number of (larger) components in the cooperation network indicates a
higher level of network cohesion.
Clustering coefficient. Studies of the network sources of social capital have
suggested that closed structures facilitate access to complex information, stimulate
trust, sustain cooperation and promote social norms by enabling the enforcement
of collective sanctions (Burt, 2000; Coleman, 1988). Traditionally, network closure
is measured through the global and local clustering coefficients.
The global clustering coefficient of a network quantifies the level of global connec-
tivity based on density of triplets. A triplet can be defined as three nodes connected
by either two (open triplet) or three (closed triplet) links. The global clustering
coefficient measures the fraction of closed triplets over the total number of open
and closed triplets, that is, the degree to which triplets in a network close up into
triangles (Newman, 2018; Opsahl and Panzarasa, 2009). For example, in the con-
text of international relations, it has been shown that countries that share bilateral
agreements with the same third parties are more likely to form bilateral agreements
themselves (Kinne, 2013).
To take the weights of links into consideration, we use a generalisation of the
global clustering coefficient based on the values of triplets (Opsahl and Panzarasa,
2009):
Cw =
∑
closed triplets vi∑
vi
(1)
Here, the value of a triplet vi is the arithmetic mean of the weights of the two
links that make up the triplet. Note that the weight of the closing link of a triplet is
not taken into account as the weighted coefficient is simply aimed at assessing the
likelihood of the closing link, and not its strength.
Unlike the global clustering coefficient, the local clustering coefficient is defined
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for a single node, and captures the connectivity of a node’s local neighbourhood.
In particular, it quantifies the tendency of a node’s neighbours to be connected with
each other.
The weighted local clustering coefficient is a generalisation of the coefficient that
takes the weights of links into consideration (see Saramäki et al., 2007, for details
on comparison of different methods). We rely on the method proposed by Onnela
et al. (2005) to account for the intensity of cooperation between countries. This
method is based on a node’s subgraph intensity, defined as the geometric average
of the weights of the links forming all closed triplets centred on the node, where
each weight is normalised by the maximum weight globally found in the network.
In addition, in what follows we discuss findings based on an alternative method
proposed by Barrat et al. (2004), according to which the contribution of each closed
triplet centred on a node depends on the ratio of the average weight of the two links
incident on the node to the average strength of the node (i.e., the node’s strength
divided by the node’s degree). Hence, in this case local distributions of weights
heavily affect the value of the weighted local clustering coefficient, while according
to the former method proposed by Onnela et al. (2005) the coefficient depends on
the distribution of weights across the whole network.
Betweenness centrality. Betweenness centrality was originally proposed by Free-
man (1977) to measure the degree to which one node lies on the shortest paths
between others. It is defined as:
CB,i =
∑
j,k
gij,k
gj,k
, (2)
where gj,k is the number of shortest paths between node j and node k, and gij,k is
the number of those paths passing through node i. If j = k, gj,k = 1, and if i ∈ j, k,
then gij,k = 0.
Betweenness centrality quantifies the extent to which a node presides over in-
direct connections between all other nodes in a network (Burt, 2000). Hence, be-
tweenness centrality is an indicator of the importance of nodes in participating in,
and controlling, the flow of critical resources in networks, such as the the spread of
information, news, opportunities across various regions of a social system (Free-
man, 1978). In international relations networks, a node with a high betweenness
centrality has a high brokerage power over otherwise disconnected countries, and
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has therefore the potential to foster and facilitate cooperation between other coun-
tries (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009).
Closeness centrality. The closeness centrality of a node is defined as the inverse
of the average shortest path length from the node to all other reachable nodes:
CC,i =
n− 1∑
j dij
, (3)
where n is the number of nodes reachable by node i, and dij is the shortest path
length between node i and node j. In social networks, higher closeness centrality,
i.e., shorter average distance from other nodes, implies quicker communication at
a lower cost (Freeman, 1978). Information from the most central nodes can spread
out quickly and in the most cost-effective manner. Thus, in our study closeness
centrality can be a proxy of the proximity of a country to other countries in the net-
work based on existing cooperative connections, and consequently of the potential
cost for sustaining cooperation with other countries.
3 The growth in environmental treaties
Before turning to network analysis, we provide a brief quantitative description
of the raw country-treaty-year data on international environmental agreements
(IEAs).
Over the past decades the number of IEAs has grown significantly. Countries
have become more active in joining them and the range of topics they cover has
increased (Mitchell et al., 2020; Mitchell, 2003). We can summarise these trends
through three statistics: the number of signatories per treaty, the number of treaties
signed by each country, and the number of environmental issues covered by IEAs.
Over the period under scrutiny, the average number of signatory countries per
treaty rose from 4 in 1948 to 31 in 2015 (Fig. 2, panel a). At the same time, the
distribution of the number of signatories per treaty has become wider and more
skewed (panel b). We have seen the emergence of global treaties that are signed
by a large number of countries (>75 countries),3 but also a significant increase
3The ten largest treaties by number of signatories, in decreasing order of size, are: Vienna Con-
vention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, Convention on Biological Diversity, United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change, United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experienc-
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in the number of treaties with fewer than 10 signatories, suggesting that formal
cooperation on both regional and global dilemmas has expanded over time.
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Figure 2: Number of countries per treaty.
The number of treaties each country signs up to has gone up in parallel (Fig. 3).
Growth was particularly fast between 1992 and 2008, when the average number
of treaties per country grew from 30 to 76 (panel a). The average patterns mask
some interesting heterogeneity (panel b). In the first part of the period under anal-
ysis, most countries tended to join only a small number of treaties, while a small
number of very active countries signed up to a large number. Over time, the dis-
tribution becomes less skewed. The absolute number of treaties increases, but the
peak decreases and moves to the right. In 1950, a few leading countries (France,
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the US) had signed over 10 treaties. In
1970 the lead group had expanded to also include Belgium, Denmark, Switzerland
and Sweden, each signing over 30 treaties. In 1990, a larger group of still mostly
European countries had signed more than 90 treaties each and in 2015 they were
signatories to over 190 treaties each.
ing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, particular in Africa, Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruc-
tion, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, United Na-
tions Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-
boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, WHO Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control (FCTC).
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Figure 3: Number of treaties per country.
By the year 2015, IEAs covered practically all aspects of regional or global en-
vironmental concern, as shown in Fig. 4. There is considerable thematic overlap,
with many treaties covering more than one subject area. For example a large num-
ber of treaties on the seas also concern issues of waste (57 treaties), fisheries (38
treaties) or wild species and ecosystems (17 treaties). In what follows, we aggre-
gate IEAs into six categories: sea and fisheries, wild species and ecosystems, waste
and hazardous substances, natural resources (e.g., water, cultivated plants, envi-
ronment genes, food, forestry, land and soil, livestock, and mineral resources), air
and atmosphere (e.g., air pollution, ozone layer depletion and climate change),
and energy.
Fig. 5 shows the total number of treaties in each of these categories over time.
It suggests an initial focus in international environmental cooperation on man-
aging shared resources, such as fish, wild species, water bodies, and natural re-
sources. Energy and air and atmosphere-related treaties came later, although the
rapid growth in IEAs during the 1990s and early 2000s was observed across subject
areas.
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Figure 4: Cumulative frequency of treaties for different subjects in 2015
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Figure 5: Cumulative frequency of treaties for different subjects
The United Nations, through the UN Environment Programme and other agen-
cies, have played a prominent role in facilitating these trends. Since it was estab-
lished in 1945, the UN has promoted over 100 IEAs. However, Figs 2, 3, and 5 sug-
gest that the broader pattern of increased environmental cooperation is not driven
primarily by the UN. A crucial exception is IEAs on air and atmosphere, where UN
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treaties account for about 50% of the total, compared with less than 25% in all other
categories.
Together, the above statistics describe how the global system of environmen-
tal governance has become larger, more inclusive and more comprehensive over
time. To understand the systemic implications of these trends we turn to network
analysis.
4 The extent of cooperation
4.1 Overview
We first explore what the growth in IEAs means for the strength and depth of envi-
ronmental collaboration. Intuitively, one would expect the proliferation of treaties
documented in Section 3 to result in deeper and more intensive environmental co-
operation. Our interest is in the topological properties of the cooperation network
and when statistically meaningful environmental cooperation emerged.
The first metrics we turn to concern network size and connectivity. A straight-
forward way to measure the size of the environmental cooperation network is the
number of nodes (countries) and links (through treaties) it contains, and more
specifically the cumulative frequency of nodes and links over time. We use two
metrics to measure the connectivity of the network, i.e., the average degree and the
average strength. Recall from section 2 that the average degree considers the av-
erage number of partners with which each country cooperates, while the average
strength describes the average intensity of cooperation of a country with others.
This analysis reveals a first stylised fact about the international network of en-
vironmental cooperation.
Stylised Fact 1: Meaningful environmental cooperation started in the early 1970s, and
since then countries have been integrated into a network of increasingly intensive environ-
mental cooperation. The growing intensity of global environmental cooperation is reflected
in the size of the network, which includes virtually all countries of the world, and a high
level of connectivity (high average degree and node strength) between countries. The UN
has been an important platform for, but not the main contributor to, the connectedness of
the environmental cooperation network.
19
4.2 Network size
A first important observation when assessing the size of the environmental coop-
eration network is that a statistically significant network only appeared in 1971.
From 1948 to 1970, the number of common treaties between any two countries is
not significantly different from the random connections in the null model.
However, since then the cumulative frequency of network nodes and network
links has grown steadily, as shown in Fig. 6. The number of participating countries
(network nodes) grew particularly fast in the early 1970s, when many of the newly
independent countries in the Global South began to engage with the international
environmental treaties. The cooperation network became stable in the year 1980,
when the number of new countries in the network begins to level off.
The emergence of a stable, statistically significant cooperation network in the
early 1970s corroborates the view of many international relations scholars, who see
the advent of the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm as
the beginning of a systematic and potentially universal approach to international
environmental policy-making (Falkner and Buzan, 2019).
The most rapid growth in network links occurred in the 1990s. During this pe-
riod, 153 treaties promoted cooperative ties among 192 countries. The growth rate
in both nodes and links levelled off around the year 2000, when nearly all countries
were members of the cooperation network and the cumulative frequency of links
almost reached its maximum.
We also investigated the role of the United Nations as a platform for interna-
tional environmental cooperation. The fact that the cooperation network became
statistically significant in the advent of the 1972 Stockholm conference and its rapid
growth after the 1992 UN ”Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro suggests that UN
treaties played an important role in encouraging countries to engage on global en-
vironmental issues. The suite of treaties agreed in Rio have come to define global
environmental cooperation in areas such as biodiversity (Convention on Biodiver-
sity), climate change (UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) and deser-
tification (Convention on Desertification).
However, the literature is equivocal about the coordinating and catalytic role
played by the UN, pointing out institutional shortcomings and arguing for a stronger
anchoring body in global environmental governance (Biermann and Bauer, 2004;
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Ivanova, 2010; Mee, 2005).
We can test these claims by filtering out UN-sponsored treaties and reconstruct-
ing the network without them. The result suggests that the impact of the UN on
the network structure has indeed primarily been indirect. UN-sponsored treaties
have had little impact on the number of countries in the network (Fig. 6a). The
majority of countries remain engaged, even with the simulated removal of the UN
treaties. The number of statistically significant cooperative links decreases without
UN treaties, but not substantially so.
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Figure 6: Cumulative frequency of nodes and links in country networks from 1971
to 2015.
4.3 Connectivity
Over the period of interest, both the average degree and the average strength in the
cooperation networks have increased greatly, as shown in panel (a) of Fig. 7 and
8. The growth in connectivity was particularly pronounced in the 1990s. During
this period the degree distribution and strength distribution both widened (panel
b), suggesting that the growth in connectivity was initially driven by a vanguard
of particularly active countries that forged ahead. By 2015, the degree distribution
had narrowed again as the laggards caught up and the average number of partner
countries reached a maximum. However, the strength distribution continues to be
wide. The cooperation network had reached a point in which connectivity did not
depend on the average number of partners, but was constantly reinforced by the
average intensity of cooperation among countries.
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Figure 7: Average degree and degree distribution from 1971 to 2015.
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Figure 8: Average strength and strength distribution from 1971 to 2015.
We again study the impact of UN-sponsored treaties on this pattern by recal-
culating the metrics for a cooperation network without UN treaties. The average
degree of the network decreases only marginally in each year (Fig. 7, panel a).
However, the exclusion of UN-sponsored treaties reduces the number of common
treaties between countries and consequently the average strength in the network.
The effect is particularly pronounced in the second half of the study period (Fig. 8,
panel a).
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5 The ease of collaboration
5.1 Overview
We next study what the proliferation of IEAs implies for the ability of countries to
cooperate and the effectiveness with which knowledge and policy are diffused.
IEAs are both the result of environmental cooperation and a facilitator of such
cooperation (e.g., Bernstein and Cashore, 2012). The shared objectives and agreed
actions from environmental cooperation are frequently codified in an IEA, but these
IEAs then create the basis for further cooperation by establishing relationships, pro-
viding platforms for engagement and setting up organisational structures to share
the benefits of cooperation (e.g., Meyer et al., 1997; Bernauer et al., 2010; Sauquet,
2014; Keohane, 1984). Cooperation through IEAs also creates trust, which is con-
sidered key to deal not only with local environmental dilemmas (Ostrom, 1990),
but also with transnational and global issues (Ostrom, 2009; Owen and Videras,
2008; Carattini et al., 2015; Hovi et al., 2015; Helland et al., 2018; Carattini et al.,
2019; Carattini and Löschel, 2021).
The environmental cooperation network also serves as an information network
(Lazer, 2005), which makes it easier for countries to produce and process infor-
mation. It has been argued that IEAs, as pieces of international law, are an impor-
tant driver of policy convergence by helping to disseminate environmental policy
knowledge and promote policy diffusion and learning (Busch et al., 2005; Fankhauser
et al., 2016; Holzinger et al., 2008).
We assess these facilitating functions of IEAs by studying the global and lo-
cal social cohesion of the environmental cooperation network. For the analysis
of global cohesion, we will refer to the concepts of components, network density,
shortest path length, and global clustering coefficient. To recall, the number of
components in a network can be used to gauge the degree of global cohesion across
the network, i.e., a network with more components is less cohesive and more frag-
mented. The network density measures the portion of the potential cooperative
connections that are actual connections through treaties. The shortest path length
describes the ease and cost of cooperation between countries induced by their struc-
tural positions. All else being equal, a network with a small number of components,
a high density and a small average shortest path length has a high level of global
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cohesion and low fragmentation.
It has been suggested that clustering fosters members’ sense of belonging to a
shared group (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993), mutual trust, the enforcement of
social norms, and the exchange of complex and proprietary information, which
in turn may facilitate coordination, cooperation and collective action (Coleman,
1988). Clustering captures social cohesion both at the global and local levels. At the
global level, the global clustering coefficient detects the degree to which connected
triads tend to close up into triangles across the network. At the local level, the
local clustering coefficient captures the tendency of a node’s neighbours to become
connected themselves. Both measures can be used to uncover closed structures as
sources of social capital, and in particular the tendency of collaboration to originate
from tightly-knit communities (global level) and third-party relationships (local
level).
Our analysis suggests the following stylised fact.
Stylised Fact 2: Over the past decades, the network of environmental cooperation has be-
come closer, denser, and more cohesive. Countries have become gradually less isolated when
dealing with environmental problems. The network now consists of just one component that
connects all countries. The combination of high cohesion at both the global and local levels
(high density, short path lengths and high clustering) creates a system that is conducive to
policy coordination and the diffusion and exchange of knowledge.
5.2 Cohesion
In the early 1970s, when statistically significant environmental cooperation links
began to emerge, the network consisted of just 37 countries which formed as many
as 12 components. Practically all of the components were regional groups (for ex-
ample, there was a component of Middle-Eastern countries) and many were bilat-
eral, consisting of just two nodes with a statistically significant link. The network
was small and fragmented.
By the early 1980s, the cooperation network had grown to 157 countries which
were integrated into a single component. New components formed in the late 1980s
and early 1990s as the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
started to engage in environmental cooperation. For example, in 1991, newly-independent
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Latvia, and Uzbekistan joined
24
the cooperation network as a separate component. They were absorbed into the
largest component in the following year, when the network coalesced again into a
single global component. Since 1992 every pair of countries (except Taiwan and
later Hong Kong) has been able to reach each other through direct or indirect
treaty-based connections.
The density of the cooperation network grew at a similar pace, increasing rapidly
through the 80s and 90s. The network began to stabilise at the start of this century,
at which point nearly every pair of countries had established a significant cooper-
ation relationship (Fig. 9, panel a).
The average shortest path length stayed at a high level in the 1970s of the cooper-
ation network, reflecting the growing size of the dominant network component, but
has fallen steadily since (Fig. 9, panel b). The size of the dominant network com-
ponent remained stable throughout this period, encompassing some 95 percent of
nodes. At the same time new connections appeared and existing connections were
strengthened through new treaties, which in turn fostered a reduction in average
path lengths. Overall, these results corroborate the view that the fall of the Soviet
Union and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s created the opportunity for
new alliances, encouraging international cooperation and policy diffusion to occur
outside the two hegemonic blocks (Yamagata et al., 2017).
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Figure 9: Cumulative density and average shortest path length from 1971 to 2015.
Although the exclusion of UN-sponsored treaties leads to a lower density, as
shown in panel (a) of Fig. 9, the overall trend does not change without the UN
treaties. The situation is the same for the average weighted shortest path length
25
after 1980. Before 1980, the exclusion of UN treaties leads to more components
and a smaller fraction of the largest component (less than 30%), which results in
lower average shortest path length. However, even without the UN treaties the
whole network remains connected from 1990 to 2015. Thus, while the UN has con-
tributed to reducing the distance between countries and, as a result, the cost of
cooperation among them, we conclude that cooperation outside UN platforms has
been as dense and effective as under the aegis of the UN. This result talks to the
debate in the literature and reconciles the two opposing views on the role played
by the UN; on the one hand we find that UN contributed to the creation of a world
environmental regime, by providing an organisational context and framework to
promote inter-state cooperation and with an agenda broad enough to include envi-
ronmental issues (Meyer et al., 1997). On the other hand, the cooperation network
emerged and developed also outside the forums provided by the UN.
5.3 Clustering
The evolution of the global clustering coefficient of the network is shown in Fig. 10.
Following a short blip in the 1970s, the clustering coefficient has grown rapidly
and steadily through the 1980s and 1990s before levelling off at the beginning of
this century. As such, the trend is comparable to that observed for the network size
and connectivity metrics. It suggests that, as the cooperation network expanded
and new links were created, third-party relationships (i.e., links between countries
sharing partners) were formed simultaneously and at the same rate.
Many factors can promote the presence of common partners, such as geographic
proximity, affiliation with related regional groups or organisations, a similar eco-
nomic status, a shared history and trading relationships (Fagiolo et al., 2010; Sauquet,
2014). The presence of common partners is likely to have promoted trust and
helped countries to establish deeper relationships.
As we have observed with other network metrics, the overall trend of the global
clustering coefficient does not change significantly when UN-sponsored treaties are
removed.
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Figure 10: Global clustering coefficient from 1971 to 2015.
6 The strategic role of countries
6.1 Overview
We now turn to the positions of individual countries in the cooperation network.
The roles of different countries in environmental cooperation is an important sub-
ject in the international relations literature, covering angles such as the influence of
hegemons (Yamagata et al., 2017) and the changing role of players like the United
States (Falkner, 2005; Kelemen and Vogel, 2010) and the European Union (Falkner,
2007; Kelemen, 2010; Vogler and Stephan, 2007).
To measure the role of individual countries we use the centrality metrics of node
strength, betweenness centrality and closeness centrality. To recall, node strength
accounts for the intensity of cooperation of a country with others, while between-
ness centrality measures the ability of a country to intermediate between others.
Closeness centrality measures the distance of a focal country to the other countries
in the network, and consequently the potential cost for further cooperation, based
on existing treaty-based connections.
We do not report node degrees. Although the node degree of a country is an
important centrality measure, which quantifies the number of partners with which
a country cooperates, the metric is less important in our case. Because of the high
density of the environmental cooperation network, there is little heterogeneity in
node degrees. The weight of links needs to be taken into account, which makes
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node strength the better metric to quantify node heterogeneity. The issue is exac-
erbated by the presence in the network of a number of large treaties with almost
global participation, which leads to a uniformly high degree for signatory coun-
tries. The phenomenon is particularly pronounced in the case of air and atmo-
sphere treaties (see Section 7 below).
The analysis gives rise to Stylised Fact 3: The network of environmental cooperation
is fundamentally global, but with a noticeable European imprint. In terms of cooperation
intensity, closeness and brokerage power, the network is heavily controlled by European
countries, in particular the United Kingdom and more recently France and Germany. The
strategic position of countries has remained relatively stable over time, although there are
important fluctuations. They include the gradual decline in the network centrality of Japan
and the US, and the emergence of South Africa as a strategic node among African countries.
6.2 Centrality
We find strong path dependence in the strategic role of individual countries in the
cooperation network. The countries that topped the centrality rankings at the out-
set were broadly able to maintain their strategic positions. This stability is in con-
trast to other networks, where the centrality of individual nodes is often highly sen-
sitive to changes in the network structure (in our case, the signing of new treaties).
We assess the stability of countries’ network position over time by looking at
the Kendall-Tau correlation coefficients of country rankings for different centrality
measures. Kendall-Tau measures the rank correlation for each centrality measure
between time window t and t+1. The starting point of the analysis is the year 1980,
when the number of countries in the network begins to stabilise (see Fig. 6a above)
and the rankings of countries are comparable.
For each centrality measure we find a statistically significant and positive cor-
relation between country rankings over time. The path dependence is most pro-
nounced in the case of strength and closeness centrality, with Kendall Tau coeffi-
cients of around 0.9. The positive correlation for betweenness centrality is lower,
but has solidified over time, from 0.65 to 0.85.
Within this stable overall pattern it is possible to discern some notable trends
for individual countries. While our methodology accentuates smaller countries,
we are interested in particular in the network position of major economies. Fig. 11
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shows overall trend in our chosen metrics for 10 major economies: five members of
the G7 (Germany, France, United Kingdom, Japan and the USA), the four BASIC
countries (Brazil, China, India and South Africa) and Russia. The statistics are
shown in terms of country rankings, since we are interested in the relative position
of countries, rather than the actual centrality scores.
The strongest positions in the network are held by European countries, which
have both high node strengths and centrality scores. For the past few years, France
and Germany were ranked first and second with respect to all three centrality mea-
sures. This makes the two countries significant hubs in environmental cooperation,
with a high cooperation intensity, significant brokerage power and, thanks to the
short network distance to other countries, the ability to exert control over the cir-
culation of information in the cooperation network.
France and Germany are replacing the United Kingdom at the top of the rank-
ings. The United Kingdom played a dominant network role in the 1980s and con-
tinues to be a hub in terms of cooperation intensity (node strength). However, its
position as a network broker (betweenness centrality) is waning.
Reflecting its recent ambivalence to international environmental cooperation,
the network centrality of the US has decreased notably over the years. The US still
exerts considerable influence over the network, but does not play the dominant role
one might expect from a global super power. The final G7 country, Japan, has also
seen its influence wane.
These rankings corroborate a widely held view in the international relations lit-
erature, which speaks of a shift in international environmental leadership from the
US to the EU (Vogler and Stephan, 2007; Kelemen and Vogel, 2010; Kelemen, 2010).
The rankings also speak to future prospects. The roles of different countries in the
cooperation network are both a reflection of their past behaviours in international
environmental politics and an indicator of future strengths or weaknesses when
seeking international cooperation.
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Figure 11: Centrality measures. Country rankings from 1980 to 2015.
Among emerging markets it is worth noting the growing network power of
South Africa. The country has a middling node strength, but is emerging as an
increasingly important broker at the centre of the network. Analysis of an Africa-
only network suggests that South Africa’s role is underpinned by its centrality, post-
Apartheid, in African environmental cooperation.
South Africa’s role is in contrast to the low centrality of other emerging mar-
kets to the cooperation network, including perhaps most notably China’s. Until
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relatively recently environmental issues were not high on the agenda of the Chi-
nese government, either domestically or internationally, although this is starting
to change, for example with an increased domestic interest in air quality and a
stronger international role on climate change (Green and Stern, 2015).
7 Differences across environmental issues
7.1 Overview
Different environmental problems have attracted international attention at differ-
ent times and with varying intensity. This reflects differences in the interplay be-
tween interests, political power and discourse within and between countries (Mitchell
et al., 2020; Mitchell, 2003), as well as the distinct characteristics of different envi-
ronmental problems (Falkner, 2013a). This makes it important to study the coop-
eration patterns among countries under different treaty subjects.
To do so, we construct separate cooperation networks for the different categories
of treaties introduced in section 3. We use the same metrics as in previous sections,
with a focus on network size (number of nodes), connectivity (degree, strength),
and cohesion (density, shortest path length, clustering coefficient).
This allows us to describe in topological terms the ’regime complexity’ dis-
cussed in the international environmental governance literature (Meyer et al., 1997;
Keohane and Victor, 2011).
The analysis gives rise to Stylised Fact 4: Environmental cooperation has distinctly
different network features depending on the subject area. Environmental coordination started
with the management of marine resources (fisheries and the sea), but is now strongest in
the area of waste and hazardous substances. The networks on species, waste and natural
resources have a hierarchical structure, where a series of densely connected, small clusters
combine into a less dense global network. This feature is absent in the networks on sea and
fisheries and air and atmosphere. Despite the high policy salience of the topic, cooperation
in the air and atmosphere network appears to be less intensive and the network is less co-
hesive. Unlike the other networks, the air and atmosphere network is heavily shaped by
UN-sponsored treaties.
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7.2 Network properties by treaty subject
The topic-specific cooperation networks obtained statistical significance at different
times. A significant cooperation network first appeared in sea and fishery affairs
in 1985, followed by natural resources in 1987, waste and hazardous substances in
1990, wild species and ecosystems in 1994 and air and atmosphere in 2000. Based
on our method, the cooperation network for energy treaties does not reach statisti-
cal significance, and we therefore do not analyse this network.
The topic-specific networks become statistically significant later than the over-
all network for methodological reasons. When treaties are divided into different
categories, each category has a smaller number of treaties, relative to the number
of countries. In some of the early country-treaty bipartite networks, the number
of countries can be more than four times the number of treaties. When project-
ing onto the country layer to obtain the cooperation network, this makes it harder
for the number of co-signed treaties between countries to be significantly differ-
ent from the null model. Our interest is therefore in the sequence in which topic
networks become significant and not the specific dates.
The different speed at which international cooperation occurred may reflect a
number of factors, including the changing salience of different environmental mat-
ters over time (e.g., the emergence of climate change as an issue in the 1990s), path
dependency (the deepening of links in areas of long-standing cooperation) and
potentially an initial focus on subjects where cooperation is easier (per Keohane
and Victor, 2011).
However, by 2005 most countries had joined all five cooperation networks, sug-
gesting that countries are now collaborating across the full range of environmental
issues. In each subject area, nearly all the countries now form a single component.
The relative growth in network size and connectivity is shown in Fig. 12. Ac-
cording to the figure, the cooperation network on waste and hazardous substances
ranks first in terms of size (number of nodes), connectivity (average degree, av-
erage strength), and global cohesion (density, average shortest path length and
global clustering coefficient).
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Figure 12: Cooperation networks for different treaty subjects.
The cooperation network on air and atmosphere is worth a closer look. Al-
though countries have a high average number of partners in this network, the aver-
age cooperation intensity is relatively low. The air and atmosphere network is also
globally less cohesive with a low density and a high average shortest path length.
In contrast, the network has a high global clustering coefficient, indicating high
local density among partners. There are a number of high-profile, often success-
ful treaties with near global membership such as the 1985 Vienna Convention and
the 1987 Montreal Protocol (Parson, 2003; Falkner et al., 2010). However, compared
with other categories the overall number of air and atmosphere treaties is relatively
small.
Consistent with the prominence of global treaties, the cooperation relations on
air and atmosphere are distributed evenly across the map and do not have an ob-
vious core (Fig. 13). This is in contrast to most other subject areas, where Fig. 13
shows a prominent core located in Europe.
A further result of note concerns the role of the UN in air and atmosphere
treaties. Unlike in the other categories, we cannot construct a statistically signif-
icant network when excluding UN-sponsored treaties. In other words, in the area
of air and atmosphere there are no significant cooperation relationships among
countries without the support of the UN. The results confirm that the UN has been
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an an effective facilitator in promoting cooperation on issues such as ozone layer
depletion, climate change, and air pollution.
(a) Sea and fisheries (b) Wild species and ecosystems
(c) Waste and hazardous substances (d) Natural resources
(e) Air and atmosphere
Figure 13: Country networks for different treaty categories in 2015.
Note: For the sake of visualisation, the figure only shows the top 10 percent of links in
terms of weight. The size of a node is proportional to its strength, and the colour of a node
(red = stronger; yellow = weaker) reflects its weighted local clustering coefficient
measured using the method proposed by Onnela et al. (2005).
7.3 Local clustering and node degree
It is instructive to look at the inter-relationship between different network metrics.
We first focus on the correlation between unweighted local clustering and degree.
For the cooperation networks on species, waste, and natural resources, coun-
tries with a larger degree tend to have a smaller local clustering coefficient: there is
a statistically significant and negative Pearson correlation coefficient between de-
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gree and local clustering coefficient. This is consistent with a hierarchical structure
in which small clusters are densely connected and combine to form larger, but less
dense, groups (Ravasz and Barabási, 2003). Similarly, when coping with these en-
vironmental issues, countries with a large number of partners are less involved in
interconnected closed triplets.
In contrast, neither the cooperation network on sea and fisheries nor the net-
work on air and atmosphere appear to have a hierarchical structure. In these net-
works, countries with a high local clustering coefficient also have a high degree:
the Pearson correlation coefficient between the two metrics is statistically signifi-
cant and positive.
The positive coefficient observed in the air and atmosphere network seems to
result of countries falling into two distinct groups with different treaty-related be-
haviours. The split can be visually detected from the bi-adjacency matrix of the bi-
partite country-treaty network (Fig. 14), which depicts which countries have signed
which air and atmosphere treaties. The rows (countries) and the columns (treaties)
of the matrix have been sorted by degree, i.e., the number of treaties each country
has signed up to, and the number of signatories each treaty has attracted, respec-
tively.
First, there is a large number of countries (from row 30 to row 190 in Fig. 14a),
for which large global treaties (i.e., those with many co-signatories, such as those
on ozone layer depletion and climate change) make up the vast majority of treaties
they have signed. In fact there are some countries (e.g., Bahrain, Burundi, Palau,
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan) that have signed up only to large treaties. The num-
ber of common treaties between any two countries in this group tends to be large
enough to pass the significance test and result in a statistically validated link be-
tween them. This, in turn, results in a one-mode projection in which countries tend
to have a high degree (large nodes in Fig. 14b) as they are connected to the many
co-signatories of the large treaties, and at the same time a large local clustering co-
efficient (red nodes in Fig. 14b) as the co-signatories they are connected too are
also likely to be connected with each other (Ravasz and Barabási, 2003).
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(a)  Bi-adjacency matrix of the bipartite 
country-treaty network 
(b)  Cooperation network
Figure 14: The cooperation network and the bi-adjacency matrix of the bipartite
country-treaty network for air and atmosphere in 2015.
Note: In panel (a), the rows (treaties) and the columns (countries) of the bi-adjacency
matrix have been sorted by degree. The figure highlights the group of few countries that
signed many treaties and ended up with small values of degree and clustering. In panel
(b), for the sake of visualisation, the country network only shows the top 10 percent of
links in terms of weight. The size of a node is proportional to its degree, and the colour of a
node reflects its unweighted local clustering coefficient measured (red = stronger; yellow
= weaker).
Second, there is a smaller group of countries which signed up to a much larger
number of treaties (about the first 30 rows in Fig. 14a). On the one hand, the num-
ber of common treaties between these countries and others in the network is rel-
atively small compared to the total number of treaties signed by these countries.
This makes it less likely for countries in this group to form statistically significant
links with countries in the former group. On the other hand, although these coun-
tries signed a large number of treaties, the number of common treaties between any
two countries in this group was not, on average, sufficiently large to pass the sig-
nificance test and resulted in a statistically validated link (as the number of treaties
signed by any two countries increases, the number of common treaties between
these countries also needs to increase to pass the significance test). Therefore,
countries in this second group tend to have a low degree as well as a small local
clustering coefficient (small and yellow nodes in Fig. 14b).
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To sum up, it is the distinctiveness of the treaty-related behaviours of countries
dealing with air and atmosphere issues that can (at least partly) explain the non-
hierarchical organisation of these countries and the unusual positive correlation
between degree and clustering observed in this network.
7.4 Local clustering and node strength
We now turn to the correlation between the weighted local clustering coefficient
and node strength. When clustering is computed through the method proposed
by Onnela et al. (2005) (see details in 2.2), there is a statistically significant and
positive correlation between weighted local clustering coefficient and strength for
each treaty category. This implies that, when copying with environmental issues,
countries characterised by intense collaborative links tend to be connected with
other countries that also collaborate with each other. That is, countries at the centre
of strong triplets are more likely to be embedded in closed structures, rich in closed
triangles, than countries at the centre of weak triplets (see Fig. 13).
For the air and atmosphere network there is a statistically significant and nega-
tive correlation between weighted local clustering coefficient and degree. Despite
the fact that, when dealing with these environmental issues, countries with many
collaborators tend to be included in triangles, the weights of the collaborative links
in these triangles are small, once again because on these issues many countries tend
to co-sign only very large treaties (Newman, 2001b).
By contrast, when we compute the weighted local clustering coefficient using
the method proposed by Barrat et al. (2004) (see details in 2.2), there is a nega-
tive correlation between weighted local clustering coefficient and node strength for
wild species and ecosystems, waste and hazardous substances, natural resources
and air and atmosphere. As this method depends on the local distribution of
weights of links, these results suggest that countries involved in many intensive col-
laborations tend to close up only triplets made of links of relatively low intensity
(compared to the average intensity). That is, according to the method proposed
by Barrat et al. (2004), weaker collaborations of highly collaborative countries are
more likely to involve partners that collaborate themselves than the more intensive
collaborative links.
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8 Conclusions
Global environmental governance has been the subject of intense academic scrutiny.
This paper adds a novel angle to this debate by providing quantitative evidence
from network analysis.
Network analysis provides a systematic, quantitative analytical lens that can
corroborate or refute evidence, often of a qualitative nature, from the existing liter-
ature. Network metrics can help to assess the depth of environmental cooperation
an flush out interesting patterns of heterogeneity, such as differences by subject
areas or the strategic importance of particular countries.
The aim of this paper was to demonstrate the power of network analysis by
identifying salient network features, or stylised facts, of international environmen-
tal cooperation. The stylised facts speak directly to important debates in the politi-
cal science, international relations and economics literature, providing quantitative
evidence in support of several theories and conjectures that have been circulating
in the literature.
The stylised facts also suggest a rich agenda of follow-up research. There are
intriguing topological differences, for example, between environmental subject ar-
eas, which are worthy of further investigation. Other lines of enquiry could move
from the global metrics used here to the meso level, investigating for example the
tendency of the most well-connected countries to generate exclusive collaborative
groups. Another avenue for future research would study the role played by the
network of IEAs in policy diffusion.
Different networks may have to be constructed for different research questions.
The network constructed here takes a country perspective. Country nodes are con-
nected through treaty links. It is an obvious choice for an analysis interested in the
international relations and political economy of environmental cooperation. Other
research questions may require a treaty-based perspective, that is, a network with
treaties as the nodes. They could be linked through shared signatories (Böhmelt
and Spilker, 2016; Kim, 2020), textual citations (Kim, 2013; Hollway and Koskinen,
2016), content similarity (Hollway and Koskinen, 2016), or geographic proximity
(Hollway and Koskinen, 2016).
Through judicious network design, network analysis can account for many of
the rich historical, cultural and economic links that exist between countries and
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which go beyond joint treaty membership, potentially including also measures of
soft power.
As we hoped to demonstrate with this paper, this makes network analysis a
powerful complement to the traditional tools used in the study of global gover-
nance and international environmental cooperation.
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